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Recent Developments 
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine: 
Federal Boat Safety Act Does Not Preempt State Common Law Tort Claims 
~e United States Supreme 
.1 Court held the Federal 
Boat Safety Act (FBSA) does not 
preempt state common-law tort 
claims. Spreitsma v. Mercury 
Marine, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 518 
(2002). Specifically, the Court held 
neither the express preemption 
clause of the FBSA, the Coast 
Guard's decision not to adopt a 
regulation, or any other implicit 
preemption within the FBSA 
preempted state common-law tort 
claims arising out offailure to install 
propeller guards on boat engines. 
Id. at 529. In so holding, the Court 
stated the most natural reading of 
the FSBA saving clause, read in 
conjunction with the preemption 
clause, indicates the Act was 
intended to preempt performance 
standards and equipment 
requirements imposed by positive 
state enactments. Id. 
Sprietsma was killed in a 
boating accident when the propeller 
of an outboard motor struck her. In 
a common law tort action in Illinois 
state court, her estate claimed the 
Mercury motor that struck her was 
unreasonably dangerous because it 
had no propeller guard. The trial 
court found the action expressly 
preempted by the FSBA, and 
dismissed the complaint. The lllinois 
Supreme Court rejected the 
expressed preemption rationale, but 
By: Carl Zacarias 
affirmed on implied preemption 
grounds. The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari 
on the issue of whether a state 
common-law tort action seeking 
damages from the manufacturer of 
an outboard motor is preempted by 
either the FBSA, or the decision of 
the Coast Guard not to promulgate 
a regulation requiring propeller 
guards on motor boats. 
Before examining the theories 
of preemption asserted by Mercury, 
the Court reviewed the history of 
federal regulation of boat safety. 
Spreitsma, 123 S.Ct. at 524. The 
Court observed Congress enacted 
the FBSA to improve the safety of 
recreation boats. Id. at 524-25. 
The Congressional purpose behind 
the FBSA is "to improve boating 
safety," to authorize "the estab-
lishment of national construction and 
performance standards for boats 
and associated equipment" and to 
encourage greater "uniformity of 
boating laws and regulations as 
among the several States and the 
Federal Government." Id. 
The Court next reviewed the 
authority of the Coast Guard to 
issue regulations establishing 
"minimum safety standards for 
recreational vessels and associated 
equipment," and requiring the 
installation or use of such equip-
ment. Sprietsma, 123 S.Ct. at 525. 
In particular, the Court pointed out 
the power of the Coast Guard to 
issue exemptions from its regu-
lations if it determined that boating 
safety "will not be adversely 
affected." Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 
4305 (1997)). 
As a primer to its analysis, the 
Court set forth the preemption and 
savings clauses in question, and the 
facts behind the Coast Guard's 
consideration of propeller guard 
regulation. Sprietsma, 123 S.Ct. 
at 525-26. The preemption clause 
states that a State "may not 
establish, continue in effect, or 
enforce a law or regulation 
establishing a recreational vessel or 
associated equipment performance 
or other safety standard or 
imposing a requirement for 
associated equipment that is not 
identical to a regulation prescribed 
under Section 4302 of this title." Id. 
(citing 46 U.S.C. § 4311(g).) The 
saving clause states that 
"[ c ]ompliance with this chapter or 
standards, regulations, or orders 
prescribed under this chapter does 
not relieve a person from liability 
at common law or under State law." 
Id. 
As for the Coast Guard 
inaction, in 1990 the Coast Guard 
concluded, after extensive study, 
the available accident data did not 
support the adoption of a regulation 
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requiring propeller guards on 
motors. Id. However, the Coast 
Guard stated it would continue to 
review information "regarding 
development and testing of new 
propeller guard devices or other 
information on the state of the art." 
Id. at 526. 
The Court began its analysis by 
treating the issue of expressed 
preemption fIrst. Id at 526-27. The 
Court held the language of the 
preemption clause is the most 
naturally read as not encompassing 
common-law claims for two 
reasons. Id. First the Court 
observed the article 'a' before 'law 
and regulation' implies statutes, not 
common law. Id Second, the 
terms "law" and "regulation" used 
together in the preemption clause 
indicate that Congress preempted 
only positive enactments by states. 
Id. The FBSA's saving clause 
buttresses this conclusion because 
it "assumes that there are some sig-
nificant number of common law 
liability cases to save and the lan-
guage of the preemption provision 
permits a narrow reading that 
excludes common law actions." Id 
The Court further stated that 
the contrast between its general 
reference to liability at common law 
and the more specific clause 
indicates it was drafted to preempt 
performance standards and equip-
ment requirements imposed by 
statute or regulation. Id The Court 
noted the rationale for Congress not 
to preempt common-law claims, 
which necessarily perform an 
important remedial role in com-
pensating accident victims. Id 
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On the issue of implied 
preemption, the Court began by 
stating the general rule on the issue. 
Sprietsma, 123 S.Ct. at 527-28. 
Implied preemption is found where 
it is impossible for a private party 
to comply with both state and 
federal requirements, or where state 
law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress. Id With that rule in 
mind, the Court rejected Mercury's 
argument the Coast Guard's 
decision not to adopt a regulation 
requiring propeller guards on motor 
boats is the functional equivalent of 
a regulation prohibiting all states and 
their political subdivisions from 
adopting such a regulation. Id. 
The Court did recognize a 
federal decision to forgo regulation 
in a given area may imply an 
authoritative federal determination 
that the area is best left unregulated. 
Id at 528. The absence of federal 
regulation has as much preemptive 
force as a decision to regulate, but 
that was not the case here. Id The 
Court found the stated reasons the 
Coast Guard gave for not issuing a 
regulation did not clearly indicate an 
intent or purpose to leave the area 
of propeller guards unregulated. Id 
Finally, the Court rejected the 
idea that the statutory scheme of the 
FBSA implicitly preempted state 
common-law tort action. Spriets-
ma, 123 S.Ct. at 529. The Court 
held the FBSA did not so com-
pletely occupy the field of safety 
regulation of recreational boats as 
to foreclose state common-law 
remedies. Id. The Court 
compared this case with Ray v. 
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 
151, 98 S.Ct. 988 (1978), which 
held for fIeld-preemption rules to 
apply there must be a "fIeld reserved 
for federal regulation" and that 
"Congress had left no room for state 
regulation of these matters." Id The 
FSBA's structure and framework do 
not convey a clear and manifest 
intent to preempt all state common 
law relating to boat manufacture. Id 
In conclusion, the Supreme 
Court's holding in Spriestma 
greatly affects many Maryland 
lawyers practicing in the areas of 
products liability and maritime law. 
Remedies in Maryland tort law are 
now available in boat safety cases. 
To the further advantage of 
plaintiff's lawyers, the FSBA 
standards and regulations can be 
used to provide proof of negligence 
while still permitting large damage 
awards in state common law. 
